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Criticism of Keats's odes seldom fails to take into 
consideration the important seemingly opposite philosophi- 
cal statements of his letters.  In particular, the "Adam's 
dream," "Negative Capability," and "Vale of Soul-making" 
letters are often mentioned, although seldom are they re- 
lated to one another.  In general, writers tend to limit 
discussion to one of the most important statements, as does 
J. M. Murry with his "Soul Making" in Keats and Shakespeare, 
or W. J. Bate in his various discussions of "Negative 
Capability."  In consequence, a survey of the literature on 
the subject yields the impression that Keats was a many 
sided, if not inconsistent thinker, the strength of whose 
poetry derives largely from its binding quality, or the 
manner in which aesthetic technique achieves the unification 
of opposing concepts.  The purpose of this thesis is to sug- 
gest the incorrectness of this impression by arguing against 
Douglas Bush's contention that the "identity" of Keats's 
"Soul-making" letter is inconsistent with his concept of 
"Negative Capability." 
After some remarks about Keats's epistoleric style 
and the general nature of his conceptual unity, Chapter II 
begins an analysis of the "Soul-making" letter with the 
purpose of defining Keats's notion of the world and the 
manner in which it relates to the human soul.  Here the 
important point is that worldly experience is to be viewed 
as a prototype for spiritual experience—that man's "Heart" 
is his means of ideal vision.  Chapter III, a discussion of 
the "Adam's dream" letter, then considers Keats's concepts 
of spiritual experience and takes up, in particular, the 
manner in which these concepts are expressed with such 
terms as "imagination," "beauty," and "truth."  Here the 
imagination is shown to be the vision, or identity, of the 
soul, and emphasis is placed on the relation of the poet's 
soul to the ideals of his art.  In Chapter IV a discussion 
of "Negative Capability" then equates Keats's ideas of 
"identity" in vision and imagination with the seemingly 
opposing concept of the artist's non-existence, or his 
identity in identification; and, finally, Chapter V consists 
of the expression of such an equation in terms of a model 
for the structure of Keats's "Ode to a Nightingale."  This 
discussion is designed to counter the numerous arguments, 
including Mr.  Bush's, that the poem reflects dramatically 
the disunity of Keats's thought. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF UNITY 
Keats wrote to his friend J. H. Reynolds: 
. . . some kind of letters are good squares others 
handsome ovals, and others some orbicular, others 
spheroid—and why should there not be another spe- 
cies with two rough edges like a Rat-trap?  I hope 
you will find all my long letters of that species, 
and all will be well; for by merely touching the 
spring delicately and etherially, the rough edged 
will fly immediately into a proper compactness, and 
thus you make a good wholesome loaf, with your own 
leven in it, of my fragments. . . .1 
He thus gives good advice not only to his friend but to the 
generations of scholars who would later come to scrutinize 
as documents of literary criticism the notes he hastily, 
and sometimes passionately, scrawled to the members of his 
circle.  By no means did Keats consider each letter a 
polished critical draft, nor all of the letters together 
a definitive statement of his philosophy.  Rather, each was 
part of the continuous speculation provoked by the communi- 
cations and intimate overflow of an uncontainable life, and 
just as he expected each one of them to "fly immediately 
into a proper compactness," so perhaps he would hold that 
there is a spring governing the entire collection.  Keats 
-'-The Letters of John Keats, ed. Hyder E. Rollins 
(Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1958), I, 80. 
Hereafter cited as Letters. 
knew that his thinking was unified only by his life and 
that his speculations all derived from that unity--a 
unity which could not conceivably find single expression 
except perhaps in poetry.  Certainly he knew also that each 
of his serious epistoleric speculations participated in the 
central core of his thinking and being, and that, taken to- 
gether, they joined to create an impression of that unity. 
Few authors have made, at the same time, such a loving and 
exacting demand on the mind and heart of an individual 
correspondent, and fewer still have required, by implica- 
tion, so much of the minds and hearts of the unanticipated 
generations of readers to come. 
Work with the letters then is at best informative, 
even inspiring, but as Keats himself suggests, not a "whole- 
some loaf" unless levened and baked by the heart of the in- 
dividual reader.  There are, moreover, sufficient analogies 
in the letters with the substance of his poems to enhance a 
reading of the poems.  In the spirit of Keats's own writing, 
it is perhaps the heart schooled in his letters that is best 
able to appreciate the fullness of life and thought which 
his odes, in particular, represent.  Keats's own "Soul- 
making" model may, therefore, best describe the relationship 
the letters bear to the poems. 
It is difficult to avoid turning the letters into a 
set of rules to explain the odes.  It is easiest, of course, 
simply to analyze the logic of terms, as Newell F. Ford 
does in his otherwise impressive work, The Prefigurative 
2 Imagination of John Keats.   But Keats himself abhorred 
"consequitive reasoning" of this type, having too great a 
faith in his "affections"  to wish to submit them to the 
limiting rigor of logic.  His philosophy, like his poetry, 
is highly organic, built on analogy and fusion, rather than 
axiom and proposition; it is an associative, not a logical, 
philosophy of aesthetics.  It is a philosophy that demands 
"leven."  It is not, then, what the letters yield as ana- 
lytic results which is important to a reading of the odes; 
it is not the specific details of them as related to the 
poetry, or the clear facts deducible from them which shed 
light on the mysteries of his art; it is rather the total 
experience they provide when fused and levened in the 
reader's mind and heart into a sense of Keats■s apprehen- 
sion of life.  In other words, one finds in the letters a 
sense of what Keats expresses in his best poetry. 
However, only in passing have the best writers 
touched on the unified aspect of the letters.  In general, 
writers have dismissed unity of concept to agree with 
Douglas Bush that a mammouth contradiction lies central 
2The Prefigurative Imagination of John Keats, 
Stanford~University Publications, University Series, 
Language and Literature, IX, 2 (Stanford:  Stanford Univ. 
Press, 1951) , pp. 9-19. 
3Letters, I, 185. 
to Keats's thinking, that the "identity" of the "vale of 
Soul-making" is inconsistent with "Negative Capability."4 
As a consequence, much elaborate and strained criticism of 
the poetry has resulted.  It is, therefore, necessary to re- 
evaluate the major statements of the letters with the inten- 
tion of relating them all to a unified core of Keats's 
thought, with the hope of finding a consistency among them. 
Before such a reevaluation is begun, however, it is perhaps 
fruitful to motivate discussion with some general remarks 
about Keats and his thought. 
The central preoccupation of Keats's thought and 
life is best characterized jointly by the words "poetry" 
and "religion."  As a poet and seeker after truth, Keats's 
posture was that of one who cannot understand what he knows, 
who yet knows with certainty what he can "but dimly per- 
ceive."   If there is any contradiction in Keats, it may 
indeed be here, on this point.  And yet such a contradic- 
tion is rather one of vision than of logic.  It is best, 
then, to consider Keats's thought as a self-conscious at- 
tempt to unify his vision rather than his vision as the 
expression of an intellectual paradox.  It is then observed 
Douglas Bush, "Keats and His Ideas," The Major Eng- 
lish Romantic Poets: A Symposium in Reappraisal, ed. 
Clarence D. Thorpe, Carlos Baker, and Bennet Weaver (South- 
ern Illinois University Press, 1957), rpt. in English 
Romantic Poets: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. M. H. Abrams 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 333. 
5Letters, II, 102. 
that the fusions and unifying images of his poetry are 
paralleled by an equally unifying intellectual concept. 
If Keats can be considered religious in the sense 
that he is concerned with the relationships of a frequently 
incomprehensible real world with a conceivable, or idealized, 
spiritual one, then his poetry can be considered religious 
in that it is an attempt to objectify that relationship. 
It would be improper to argue, however, that Keats was 
religious above all else.  According to W. J. Bate's thor- 
ough reconstruction of Keats's intellectual development, 
and from certain of the earliest poems ("To George Felton 
Matthew," "Epistle to My Brother George," and "Sleep and 
Poetry") it seems far more likely that his earliest thoughts 
concerned only poetry and the kind of literary immortality 
too little involved with "beauty" and "truth" to be con- 
strued as religious.   If he became religious, it was 
through poetry, so that his theology is sufficiently rooted 
in the growth of his art to be inseparable from it.  His 
identity as a poet must remain preeminent. 
The poetic identity Keats strove to achieve was one 
which would objectify that religious relationship of the 
real with the spiritual worlds, one unencumbered by "dis- 
agreeables."   Only to such a poet would poetry come "as 
6Walter Jackson Bate, John Keats (New York: 
Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 108-148. 
7Letters, I, 192. 
Oxford 
easy as leaves to a tree."   But this identity was not one 
to grow out of intellectual or traditional religious expe- 
rience, nor even as a criticism of these in the form of a 
renegade mysticism.  Depending almost entirely on his own 
experience, he derived his religion from a quality of 
vision—he perceived within his own being a characteristic 
human harmony, the essence of being human, in what remains 
everlastingly God's world.  Fulfillment of his religion was 
the eternalization of this vision in a transmutation of 
real experience into an equal timelessness with God's.  In 
other words, for Keats, vision, individual identity, and 
eternity, all comprehensible only in terms of a decidedly 
Platonic God, are inextricable from one another and, for 
him, religion has more to do with the spontaneous involve- 
ment in one's humanity than with belief in abstract ideas. 
Identity then is the quality of self-awareness which joins 
man with God.  It is also the poetic identity which joins 
the real and spiritual worlds.  This identity is very much 
similar to Keats's concept of the "soul" as expressed in 
the "Soul-making" letter.  What is most significant, how- 
ever, is that it is similar also to Keats's idea of "Nega- 
tive Capability," more identical with it than at all con- 
tradictory, and, therefore, consistent with his most pene- 
trating statements concerning the poetic character. 
'Letters, I, 238. 
In order to discuss the major themes of Keats's 
philosophy and to point out the consistency among them, it 
is necessary to limit the sphere of discussion to the 
statements, or the themes, of three letters.  These state- 
9 
ments are "Soul-making,"  the "Adam's dream" letter, with 
its references to beauty and truth,   and "Negative Capa- 
bility."    The order of the letters as they are dealt with 
here is not the order in which they occur chronologically. 
It is accepted as basic to this discussion that the order- 
ing of the actual letters makes no difference, that Keats 
had all these notions in mind throughout, and that these 
notions may have found expression in any number of forms 
preceding those letters which still survive.  It seems il- 
logical to assume that the letters mirror a strict chronol- 
ogy in Keats's mind.  It may very well be that his first 
thoughts concerning the "vale of Soul-making" came long 
before he jotted them down to the George Keatses, as is 
12 the case with the "indolent" letter,   which antedated the 
9Letters, II, 101-104.  The "Soul-making" statement 
occurs in a section of the long journal letter to the George 
Keatses, dated 21 April 1819, in its entirety No. 159 in 
Rollins. 
10Letters, I, 183-187.  The "Adam's dream" letter is 
addressed to Benjamin Bailey, dated 22 November 1817. 
^Letters, I, 191-194.  The "Negative Capability" let- 
ter is addressed to George and Tom Keats, dated (probably) 
27 December 1817. 
12Letters, II, 78-81.  Another section of the journal 
letter No. 159. 
8 
writing of the famous ode by at least six months.  It is 
meant to be significant, however, that the order the 
letters are placed in here does reflect the induction of 
Keats's thought:  consideration of worldly experience in 
the "vale of Soul-making" is followed by speculations 
about the imagination, or the soul's function, in the 
"Adam's dream" letter, and, finally, the soul's expression 
in poetry is taken up as "Negative Capability." 
CHAPTER II 
SOUL-MAKING 
The worldly dimension of experience is most thor- 
oughly explored in the "Soul-making" letter.  In this, the 
most basic of the letters to be considered, Keats discusses 
the bearing of worldly experience on the growth of spiritual 
life, or the "soul."  Keats is primarily concerned in it 
with the manner in which a human being actually acquires a 
soul, stressing that the world of experience is absolutely 
essential to the soul's development and, consequently, that 
conventional religious concepts are far from adequate for 
his purposes.  He claims that there is no changing the 
basic divinity of man's being, but that there is a vast 
difference between being just a spark of God and being a 
human soul with a unique identity.  An intelligence which 
comes from God, he says, does not become a soul until it 
acquires an "identity."  Identity, however, develops from 
the relation of intelligence with experience and pain. 
Identity then is the central issue of "Soul-making," al- 
though not in the manner of "those who have a proper self," 
or "Men of Power,"1 for it is no set group of ideas, but 
rather a capacity for experience and vision. 
1Letters, I, 18 4. 
10 
To understand Keats's concept of identity, it is 
perhaps best to begin with his introductory remarks on the 
nature of human experience.  Here he defines the nature of 
worldly, or real, experience to be considered in the "Soul- 
making" discussion, and the reason for man's absolute re- 
liance on real experience for his spiritual development. 
Keats writes: 
The most interesting question that can come before 
us is, How far by the persevering endeavours of a 
seldom appearing Socrates Mankind may be made 
happy—I can imagine such happiness carried to an 
extreme—but what must it end in?—Death—and who 
could in such a case bear with death—the whole 
troubles of life which are now frittered away in 
a series of years, would the[n] be accumulated for 
the last days of a being who instead of hailing its 
approach, would leave this world as Eve left Para- 
dise—But in truth I do not at all believe in this 
sort of perfectibility—the nature of the world will 
not admit of it—the inhabitants of the world will 
correspond to itself—Let the fish philosophise the 
ice away from the Rivers in winter time and they 
shall be at continual play in the tepid delight of 
summer.  Look at the Poles and at the sands of 
Africa, Whirlpools and volcanoes—Let men extermi- 
nate them and I will say that they may arrive at 
earthly Happiness—The point at which Man may arrive 
is as far as the paralel state in inanimate nature 
and no further—For instance suppose a rose to have 
sensation, it blooms on a beautiful morning it en- 
joys itself—but there comes a cold wind, a hot sun— 
it can not escape it, it cannot destroy its annoy- 
ances—they are as native to the world as itself: 
no more can man be happy in spite, the world[l]y 
elements will prey upon his nature. . . . 
J. M. Murry's remarks on this passage deal with 
Keats's reality in terms of the nature of his mind. 
2Letters, II, 101. 
3John Middleton Murry, Keats and Shakespeare 
(London:  Oxford Univ. Press, I92TT, pp. 132-148.  The 
chapter is entitled "Soul-Making." 
11 
According to Murry, Keats had one of those purely poetic 
minds which must proceed to truth by the perception of 
harmony.  To such a mind, the consecutive rigor of logic 
is irrelevant.  Instead the mind works with patterns and 
metaphors, and beauty is the test of truth.  In this pas- 
sage, Keats is discussing man's place in the harmony of the 
world, a harmony which can be considered beautiful in spite 
of the suffering and death it includes.  In Murry's inter- 
pretation, Keats first confronts many conventional religious 
notions by dismissing as foolish the idea that misery and 
suffering must be eliminated if man is to be happy.  He 
asserts that death's inevitability requires suffering as 
a necessary preparation.  His implication is that to elimi- 
nate pain upsets the natural order in which death is actu- 
ally least objectionable.  This is the empirical Keats who 
is capable of a scientist's acceptance of worldly phenomena. 
Yet his empiricism is based on an hierarchy of troubles 
which derives from a principle of poetic justice.  It is 
partially his idea of justice more than his metaphoric turn 
of mind which gives greater meaning to the idea of natural 
order in the often quoted passage about the rose. 
According to Murry, Keats goes on to say that not 
only is "perfectibility" undesirable, it is simply not 
man's nature as part of an order where death is as natural 
and as inevitable as life itself.  In describing the 
12 
enjoyment of the rose at the most basic natural level, 
Keats shows why suffering and death must be a part of 
man's experience as well.  He suggests that there is a 
balance struck between an organism and its environment, 
involving destructive forces whose claim to existence is 
equal with that of the lives they threaten.  Keats's point 
is that man fits the world as does the rose, and his blush 
pales as the rose's.  This is good, he implies, not tragic, 
and the only superiority in man lies in a spirituality 
which comes not from trying to conquer life but by accept- 
ing it and looking to intensify the experience that it does 
offer. 
In addition to Murry's reasoning, it might be fur- 
ther pointed out that in this "harmony" which Keats has 
discerned, there is no great concern with temporality. 
Keats's eye, dealing primarily with images which are 
generally arrested in time, here seizes on life from birth 
to death as a totality of reference, a kind of eternal 
object.  He looks for meaning in the depth of image rather 
than in its extension pointlessly through time.  This is 
an expression of Keats's aversion to reasoning in the ab- 
stract; and his preference always for dealing only with the 
concrete.  In short, unable to accept the notion of eternity, 
it was necessary for Keats to discover a principle of 
spirituality within the limited bounds of worldly experience. 
13 
Keats makes it quite clear that apart from his 
basic nature and potentials, man, like the rose, has only 
his experience in the real world.  This statement puts 
life and experience at the center of speculation concern- 
ing spiritual matters.  Keats will not have man sent ar- 
bitrarily off to an after-life, so the burden of fulfilling 
the human potential must lie with worldly experience.  It 
must be from a man's life in a world of hardship and death 
that his identity and, therefore, his soul will ultimately 
grow.  In this sense, the real world might be considered 
the domain of the identity, and the attributes and functions 
of identity share the characteristics of its reality. 
The next portion of the letter is still introductory, 
although it involves actual "Soul-making" more directly. 
It introduces the ideal, or eternal, aspect of Keats's 
philosophy, his ideas of "intelligence" and "God" and their 
relations to his "identity": 
The common cognomen of this world among the mis- 
guided and superstitious is 'a vale of tears' from 
which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary 
interposition of God and taken to Heaven—What a 
little circumscribe[d] straightened notion! Callu 
the world if you Please '"The vale of Soul-making" 
Then you will find out the use of the world (I am 
now speaking in the highest terms for human nature 
admitting it to be immortal which I will here take 
for granted for the purpose of showing a thought 
which has struck me concerning it)  I say 'Soul 
making' Soul as distinguished from an Intelligence- 
There may be intelligences or sparks of the divinity 
in millions-but they are not Souls [the] till they 
acquire identities, till each one is personally 
14 
itself. I [intelligences are atoms of perception— 
they know and they see and they are pure, in short 
they are God. . . ,4 
Here Keats substitutes directly his "Soul-making" 
idea for the "straitened" notion of convention.  In re- 
placing "tear" with "Soul-making" he restates his princi- 
ple that the pain or misery of life is not meaningless, 
but creative, and that rather than being a place of sense- 
less trials, the world has a use integral with man's true 
spirituality.  He most emphatically asserts the relation of 
the "world" with spirituality, moreover, by the word "use"— 
there is a direct developmental connection between the world 
and the "soul."  When he claims that human "intelligence" 
is "God," he is really making a distinction between human 
immortality and the more comprehensive concept of the soul. 
What is clear is that given man's immortal nature, his 
spiritual dimension derives from his experience.  Deity is 
given; it is static.  But the world projects the dimension 
of the soul. 
Keats's phrase "personally itself," which seems so 
troublesome to Mr. Bush, takes on special significance here. 
Keats's concept of the "man of power" would provide the 
inconsistency Bush observes—but the soul is not this 
"proper self."  Again, Keats is not. concerned with ideas; 
so far he has mentioned only the divinity of intelligence, 
4Letters, II, 101-102. 
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and experience in terms of sensory perception.  The soul, 
he implies, results from the combining of these.  He makes 
no mention of the conceptual or rational, so that "per- 
sonally itself" must correspond with a mode of experience, 
an extended awareness, or a quality of vision.  This is 
consistent with Murry's concept of the pure poetic mind. 
For Keats, experience and intelligence combine associa- 
tively, not logically, to create the soul instead of the 
self of the "man of power." 
In Keats's view, then, "personally itself" means 
anything but a static, well-defined personal domain or 
exact being.  Like identity, it is rather the capacity of 
heightened awareness through a more perfect vision, result- 
ing perhaps in total ignorance of what the "man of power" 
calls self.  It is, in fact, what later shall be described 
as a loss of self.  Keats apparently had in mind the ability 
to empathize, which can result in an empathy with one's 
self in the truest expression of the soul.  This empathy 
provides the ability to experience the momentary beauty of 
one's life, one's season as a rose, without regard to time, 
and to accept its beauty as eternal.  It is a quality that 
is radiated but not contained by life. 
The final passage of this letter to be considered 
begins to deal more specifically with the exact relation 
between the world and divinity, or the action of "Soul- 
16 
making."  It is from this action that more exact inferences 
about identity as vision can be made, and a more precise 
apprehension of Keats's developing spirituality achieved. 
The added concept in this passage is the "heart"—it 
mediates between divinity, or intelligence, and the world. 
The heart represents the worldliness of man, and indicates 
the manner in which man's divinity is able to correspond 
with the world in his identity.  But in the way that Keats 
describes the heart, it becomes the means of vision of the 
soul, and the prototype of the soul's experience.  Keats 
writes : 
. . . how then are Souls to be made?  How then are 
these sparks which are God to have identity given 
them--so as ever to possess a bliss peculiar to 
each one's individual existence?  How, but by the 
medium of a world like this?  This point I sincerely 
wish to consider because I think it a grander system 
of salvation than the chryst[e]ain religion—or 
rather it is a system of Spirit-creation.—This is 
effected by three grand materials acting the one 
upon the other for a series of years—These three 
Materials are the Intelligence—the human heart (as 
distinguished from intelligence or Mind) and the 
World or Elemental space suited for the proper action 
of Mind and Heart on each other for the purpose of 
forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess 
the sense of Identity.  I can scarcely express what 
I but dimly perceive—and yet I think I perceive it— 
that you may judge the more clearly I will put it in 
the most homely form possible—I will call the world 
a School instituted for the purpose of teaching 
little children to read--I will call the human heart 
the horn Book used in that School—and I will call 
the Child~abTe to read, the Soul made from that 
school and its hornbook.  Do you not see how neces- 
sary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an 
Intelligence and make it a soul?  A Place where 
the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse 
ways!  Not merely is the Heart a Hornbook,  It is the 
^ 
17 
Minds Bible, it is the Minds experience, it is the 
teat from which the Mind or intelligence sucks its 
identity—As various as the Lives of Men are—so 
various become their souls, and thus does God make 
individual beings, Souls, Identical Souls of the 
sparks of his own essence. . . .5 
To appreciate this passage, it is again useful to go 
to Murry.  He writes, "In this remarkable passage, Keats 
is discovering a harmony in the world within man which 
completes the harmony he had previously discovered in the 
world without him."   The external harmony had involved the 
mediation by man's life between the divinity of his nature 
and the "Elemental space" of the real world.  Such media- 
tion made "Soul-making" possible through the development 
of identity; to be "personally itself," Keats inferred, an 
intelligence must have had a relationship with the world of 
suffering and death.  But now he deals directly with the 
development of identity by making a specific connection 
between the pain of the world and the intelligence that is 
divinity.  As life mediated between divinity and the world, 
now the heart mediates between experience and intelligence 
to create the vision that Keats calls identity.  The harmony 
which Mr. Murry writes of as appropriate to the "world 
within" is one whose motivation is the heart. 
According to this reasoning, the importance of the 
heart is paramount in that it represents both the most 
5Letters, II, 102-103. 
Murry, p. 137. 
18 
complex of human phenomena and the force in man whose 
action is the final cause of "Soul-making."  It is central 
because in the minimal, metaphysical sense, the heart it- 
self is man; the heart is man living and growing, or the 
sum of his experiences.  It is his instincts, organized 
perceptions, emotions, or subconscious.  The scientist 
would say that Keats's heart is the interface between man 
and his physical medium, or his physical self.  There accu- 
racy is assured.  But more poetically, the heart is man's 
vague, but incontestable, knowledge that he is alive. 
The heart's complexity derives from its dual char- 
acter—it is experience of the world, and it is also expe- 
rience of itself in the world.  Like instinct and passion, 
it lies in an uncertain area between knowledge and expe- 
rience, or memory and condition.  For Keats, the complexity 
of the heart derived almost certainly from the earlier dis- 
cussion of the world of troubles and sorrows.  It is a 
simpler thing to be like the rose, at the mercy of external 
troubles.  Man, however, is not only a victim of the world, 
but he can be a victim of himself as well, particularly of 
his passions.  It is far easier to accept the necessity of 
troubles in the rose's world; but the acceptance of one's 
self as part of the world of troubles leads to the great 
problem of "Soul-making" itself. 
19 
F 
In likening the heart to the subconscious, Murry 
also likened the intelligence to the conscious mind, 
stipulating three kinds of knowledge in Keats's system: 
"mind knowledge," or the intelligence, is the conscious 
mind; "heart knowledge" is the unconscious mind, and "soul 
knowledge" is the result of a certain action of the uncon- 
scious on the conscious mind.  The process of "Soul-making," 
he infers, is the creation of this soul-knowledge. 
Soul knowledge begins when the conscious knowledge 
of the mind works on the unconscious knowledge of the heart. 
It is not what the mind is able to conclude from heart 
knowledge that is important, but in what manner the mind 
itself changes as it assimilates heart knowledge.  Murry 
claims that such an assimilation yields self awareness of 
the mind, "soul knowledge," or a "knowledge that the soul 
is, a knowledge of the individual's true self existence" 
which "results immediately in a knowledge of the harmony 
and necessity of that universe, whose workings in the heart 
q 
are the primary source of 'soul knowledge.'"   These state- 
ments are comprehensible in terms of his discussion of the 
"indolent letter," where the poetic spirit is shown to be 
an instinctive being, whose characteristic is that heart 
knowledge overpowers the mind or reduces it to its own 
Murry, p. 139. 
3Murry, p. 140. 
20 
level of instinctive activity.  The instinctive activity 
of the mind, Murry implies, is the soul or the mind that 
speaks from the instinctive physical being, the surrendered 
9 
mind in control of the heart. 
The meaning of this soul lies in self-identification 
through the world which forms the heart.  In a sense, this 
describes a paradox resolved by the heart.  That is, the 
mind which is God and sees, cannot see itself, or have 
identity, except by interacting with the heart.  In the 
heart, the mind then sees itself or acquires knowledge of 
its existence.  The mind achieves identity by looking at an 
altered part of itself in the heart.  In the sense that 
the heart is of the world, the heart can even be symbolic 
of universal harmony which could easily itself be repre- 
sented by another object entirely. 
In this fashion identity again reduces to the subject 
of vision, or the apprehending of self in terms of something 
else.  When Keats, or Murry, speaks of seeing the harmony 
of the universe, in particular, it is likely he speaks of 
seeing one's self by a representation in the heart.  Iden- 
tity, as Keats conceives of it, concerns the act of mind 
merging with something outside itself by sight, or some 
other sense, in order to achieve its most heightened aware- 
ness of self.  This might be called asserting the "self" 
Murry, p. 137, 
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by  experience   of   "Not-self,"   or   indeed  asserting  existence 
through   non-existence,   or  a  variety  of   such  propositions, 
all  of  which   point   inexorably  toward   "Negative  Capability." 
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CHAPTER III 
ADAM'S DREAM 
In a discussion of the "Adam's dream" letter, it is 
possible to arrive at a very similar statement, one of 
Keats's identity as "vision."  The statement must differ 
in that where the "Soul-making" letter started with the 
world and with real experience centering around the heart, 
now the first considerations are to be spiritual in the 
sense of the "imagination," with primary concern for the 
characteristics of Keats's kind of spirituality, "beauty," 
and "truth."  Here the problem is to discuss the object of 
projection, the spiritual life itself, which has been de- 
rived from the world, and to relate it back to the project- 
ing medium of identity in an effort to show the essential 
unity of all Keats's separate statements.  In other words, 
the truth of the imagination is what is at issue here, and 
how it relates with the vision-identity of "Soul-making." 
In this letter, which primarily concerns the 
"imagination," it is important that Keats's first remarks 
indicate his mind is, at the same time, occupied with ideas 
similar to "Negative Capability" and the identity of "Soul- 
making."  At first he uses the word "genius," referring 
here to the poetic talents of men like Shakespeare, in 
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close association with heart—"I wish you knew all that I 
think about Genius and the Heart—";  such a juxtaposition 
associates the character of the poet with the propensities 
of the heart, or, at any rate, implies that when Keats 
thought of one, he also thought of the other.  Taking 
"genius" to be a derivative of "Negative Capability," as 
he does later, what results is an association of the non- 
existence of the poet with the properties of the heart. 
Slightly further on, Keats makes this association again: 
. . . Men of Genius are great as certain ethereal 
Chemicals operating on the Mass of neutral intel- 
lect—by they have not any individuality, any deter- 
mined Character.  I would call the top and head of 
those who have a proper self Men of Power. . . .2 
In this passage, a relationship of the poetic character 
with the heart is implied.  Here the non-existence, or 
identity, of the poet is equated with "genius," which al- 
ready has been associated with the heart.  Since Keats 
breaks off at this point to speculate on the imagination, 
then, it might be inferred that what he has said does not 
bear on the imagination.  On the other hand, considering 
his associative thought process, it is not significant that 
he seems to change his subject; it is rather proof of the 
relation of his ideas that he thought them in such rapid 
sequence.  After all, he sat longing "to be talking about 
1Letters, I, 184. 
2 Loc. cit. 
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...3 the Imagination—"  while discussing the "Men of Genius." 
It is, therefore, likely that imagination put him in mind 
of "genius" and the heart, and that the letter is, until 
this point, a false start.  This would seem to point rather 
toward his conceiving of imagination in terms of genius, 
the heart, and "Negative Capability."  Murry implicitly 
contends for such an associative view of Keats's thought 
process in his discussion of "Soul-making," and it is 
obvious that his ability to appreciate Keats in this 
fashion brings him closer to the spirit of the letter he 
discusses.  One aspect of the limitations found in the 
only extensive study of the "Adam's dream" letter, N. F. 
Ford's The Prefigurative Imagination of John Keats, is that 
Ford's analytic technique allows for no such relationship; 
Ford begins analysis of the letter well into the second 
paragraph, only after all matters seemingly extraneous to 
4 
his analysis have been finished. 
Actually, the first remarks about the imagination 
that Keats makes here, and the main theme of the letter, 
directly implicate the heart of "Soul-making": 
I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the 
heart's affections and the truth of Imagination-- 
What the imagination seized as Beauty must be truth— 
whether it existed before or not—for I have the 
Loc. cit. 
Ford, p. 2 0 
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same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they are 
all in their sublime, creative of essential 
Beauty. . . .-> 
Keats here uses imagination to represent the activity of 
the soul whose identity, or existence, he frames in the 
"Soul-making" letter.  He makes then an implicit distinc- 
tion between the existence and capabilities of the soul by 
discussing here the imagination, or the apprehension of 
truth, as the soul's function.  Keats evidently does not 
feel he must additionally justify the soul's existence in 
this letter, in that he chides Bailey for a "momentary 
start about the authenticity of the Imagination."   It is 
likely that at this point Keats could, in fact, have pro- 
vided justification with a "Soul-making" statement, but 
such was not his purpose.  His references here to the func- 
tions of the soul, rather than to the soul's justification, 
are meant simply to relate those functions to "Soul-making" 
in order to make them more credible to a logical mind. 
With these remarks it seems best to avoid definition, 
and to look for meaning relative to other ideas of Keats's 
already discussed.  Truth, for example, seems not to lend 
itself to definition except in the most general terms, such 
as those of Bate:  "... the joint 'identity,' character, 
'Letters, I, 184. 
Loc. cit. 
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reality, and beauty of a phenomenon."   Such a definition 
is a positivist's nightmare of undefinable terms.  Yet in 
a functional sense, truth, taken in context, or defined by 
the associative relationship within each individual sen- 
tence, appears consistent, meaningful, and pertinent.  In 
fact, the special power of Keats's language may indeed be 
his extended, almost objective, use of abstractions—he 
rarely pins himself down to logical, consistent definitions; 
rather, with unique relationships, he makes language rise 
to the demands of unique occasions.  He is not at all re- 
strained by his words; words are objects of organic com- 
plexity for him, and derive their significance more from 
their relation with other words than from intrinsic mean- 
ings.  It will not do to discuss beauty, that is, except 
in terms of truth, imagination, and the heart, just as dis- 
cussion of the soul requires at least both mind and heart. 
Keats's language, that is, forms a complex in which each 
word derives its meaning from its place in the whole.  To 
study a single concept, or word, means to collapse the 
complex and sterilize the word.  It seems to be the case 
with Keats's language as it is with the energy systems of 
nature, that to measure it is to destroy it. 
7Walter Jackson Bate, The Stylistic Development of 
Keats, The Modern Language Association of America, Revolv- 
IHg-Fund Series, XIII (New York:  Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), 
p. 45. 
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With this spirit we can return to the passage.  In 
writing, "I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the 
Heart's affections and the truth of the Imagination—," 
Keats is, at the same time, again summarizing the entire 
"Soul-making" argument, and, by association, asserting that 
the soul's existence is fulfilled by its peculiar function, 
imagination, whose faculty is the realization of truth. 
There is so much of Keats's thought and thought process in 
this remark that a careful investigation of it is necessary 
and possibly very fruitful. 
First, it must be recalled that Keats summarized 
"Soul-making" by calling the heart the "Mind's Bible." 
Here, the "Heart's affections" equate with subconscious 
heart-knowledge, or the instincts and passions of man's 
worldly nature.  By calling these holy, Keats indicates 
that he is thinking again of the "Mind's Bible," and, in 
different words, only asserting the "Soul-making" concept 
that the world is the book or basis of spiritual experience. 
In addition, the structure of this sentence must be appre- 
ciated for its associative relationships rather than for 
straightforward logic.  When Keats writes, "the holiness 
of the Heart's affections and the truth of the Imagina- 
tion—," it is far more important that "Heart's affections" 
and "truth of the Imagination" are yoked together than that 
they are both matters about which he is "certain."  In this 
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sentence, it may be presumed that "and" is not just a 
conjunction, but signifies a complex relationship involv- 
ing both causality and mutual definition of the terms 
heart, truth, imagination, and soul.  In Keats's mind, 
that is, the idea of the soul referred to by the "holiness 
of the Heart's affections" was causally associated with 
the soul's function or the experience of truth by the 
imagination.  In other words, this sentence illustrates 
his idea that the experience of truth testifies to the 
existence of the soul.  Here, as in much of his expression, 
it seems sufficient for substantives to be linked by "and" 
for a variety of associative relationships to exist between 
them. 
It is important that Keats makes such an association, 
for at first he seems to be introducing the terms truth and 
imagination peremptorily, not having defined them with re- 
spect to "Soul-making."  As an introduction, he writes only 
Q 
that Bailey is "acquainted with my innermost breast"  in 
respect to the heart.  It may be that statements concerning 
the heart, similar to "Soul-making," possibly implicating 
these terms, had already been made, either verbally or in 
lost letters, indicating certainly that Keats had this 
particular character of the heart in mind now that he does 
ite of the imagination and truth.  At any rate, when wr 
8 Letters, I, 184. 
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these terms are, in fact, comprehended in the language and 
ideas of "Soul-making," the need for any precise definition 
of them drops away. 
Imagination here can be considered a property of 
the soul, not as a thing in itself; it exists in the same 
way that sunshine exists.  Where the soul is the mind's 
spontaneous vision of self as explained with reference to 
"Soul-making," the imagination is the manifest character of 
that vision, or the effluence of the soul's identity.  As 
the sun is not defined except in terms of its light in a 
world of men, so the existence of the soul is manifest in 
imagination, or in the energy the soul gives off.  And, to 
make the metaphor complete, as the sun's light is only 
known when it strikes an object, so is the existence of the 
imagination made known in its realization of truth.  If 
any definition must be made of imagination, in the spirit 
of Keats, let it be called the light of the soul that il- 
luminates truth. 
But truth is related to "Soul-making" as well, in 
the spirit of the soul as self-vision.  This can be shown 
by a further consideration of the sentence under scrutiny. 
If the relationship represented by "and" between the heart 
and truth of the imagination is one of causality, it is a 
question then of transposing truth back into the terms of 
"Soul-making."  This can be done by looking first at the 
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parallelism of "Heart's affections" and "Imagination" as 
they appear in the sentence.  On the one hand, Keats in- 
dicates by "Heart's affections" the existential quality 
of the soul, and on the other, by "Imagination," the 
functional.  This is again like speaking of the sun and 
the sun's light; each phrase implies the other, but is 
unique in its orientation.  At the same time, each is modi- 
fied, the one by holiness and the other by truth.  In this 
way truth becomes associated with the concept of the 
"Mind's Bible."  Keats's meaning then is not just that the 
mind apprehends the heart as the imagination apprehends 
truth, but that the heart is the medium of vision of the 
soul, that it is the window through which the soul looks 
to find identity in the elemental space of the world, and 
that this vision through the heart is the same as the light 
of imagination, so that the identity conceived in elemental 
space must be truth. 
Without defining beauty, then, the next part of the 
passage is also understandable as a "Soul-making" equiva- 
lent.  The meaning here comes from a closer scrutiny of the 
relationship between the nouns of the sentence.  In writing, 
"What the imagination seized as Beauty must be truth," 
Keats places an important restriction on the relation of 
the imagination with truth.  He says, in effect, that the 
imagination cannot know truth for itself directly and 
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immediately as truth, but that what appears beautiful to 
the imagination is also truthful.  In other words, truth 
is an intrinsic quality of the object of imaginative vision 
whose effect in the imagination is beauty.  The "must" of 
Keats's statement implies that truth can only be known 
through beauty, and if imagination is to find its realiza- 
tion in truth, as has been suggested, it can only do so in 
respect to beauty.  Beauty, then, might be called truth's 
knowable dimension, as heat is known by warmth, and happi- 
ness by the sudden agreeable aspect of all things.  Beauty 
falls into perspective, therefore, in this manner:  imagina- 
tion is the sight of the soul; when the soul sees, the ob- 
ject of its vision is truth; beauty, then, is the charac- 
teristic by which the soul identifies truth.  Yet whether 
beauty is a property of the imagination or of truth cannot 
be stated.  It can only be said for sure that without either, 
it cannot exist.  Keats's ultimate sophistication, and his 
indestructible intellectual achievement in both poetry and 
letters, owes much to this ability to seize meaning in 
relationships, and to avoid definition in favor of charac- 
terizing abstract nouns by their relationships with one 
another.  There was nothing "consequitive"  about his rea- 
soning, but the precision with which he uses abstract 
9Letters, I, 18 5, ". . . I have never yet been able 
to percelv^ho^ anything can be known for truth by consequi- 
tive reasoning—." 
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language achieves the profundity of mathematical truth. 
It is important now to examine Keats's "beauty" in 
terms of the heart and "world of sorrows," to see in what 
sense it is characteristic of the "Soul-making" process. 
Like most of Keats's terms, beauty both defines other terms 
by its relationships with them and finds its own definition 
in these same relationships.  Keats wrote:  "... I have 
the same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they are all 
in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty—."    One 
must work with the associative relationships of the terms, 
particularly those concerning the word "sublime."  Here 
again this word has the ring of traditional Christianity, 
and summarizes, for Keats, the significance of the heart in 
"Soul-making."  The "Passions" correspond with the heart, 
subconscious, or with Murry's "heart-knowledge."  "Soul- 
making" concerns the projection of these passions into the 
soul.  The "Mind's Bible" and holiness have previously 
captured the spiritual quality of the soul relative to the 
heart.  "Sublime" now does the same.  "Passions in their 
sublime" need be considered nothing more nor less than the 
soul, and "creative of essential Beauty" implies the soul's 
causal relation with beauty.  What Keats is saying here is 
that only through "Soul-making" is beauty known; "Soul- 
making" does not strictly create beauty, he infers, but in 
10 Letters, I, 184. 
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it  is   born the   faculty  by which beauty  is known.     Or, 
"Beauty"   is   the  knowledge  of   the  soul's   realization   in  the 
world. 
"Adam's dream" is a near-poetic wording of this last 
statement.  Keats writes: 
. . . The Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream— 
he awoke and found it truth.  I am the more zealous 
in this affair, because I have never yet been able 
to perceive how anything can be known for truth by 
consequitive reasoning--and yet it must be—Can it 
be that even the greatest Philosopher ever [when] 
arrived at his goal without putting aside numerous 
objections—However it may be, 0 for the Life of 
Sensations rather than of Thoughts!  It is 'a Vision 
in the form of Youth1 a Shadow of reality to come— 
and this consideration has further conv[i]nced me 
for it has come as auxiliary to another favorite 
Speculation of mine, that we shall enjoy ourselves 
here after by having what we called happiness on 
Earth repeated in a finer tone and so repeated—And 
yet such a fate can only befall those who delight in 
sensation rather than hunger as you do after Truth 
Adam's dream will do here and seems to be a convic- 
tion that Imagination and its empyreal reflection 
is the same as human Life and its spiritual repeti- 
tion.  But as I was saying—the simple imaginative 
Mind may have its rewards in the repeti[ti]on of its 
own silent Working coming continually on the spirit 
with a fine suddenness. . . . 
Here are a new set of relationships which clarify 
the meaning of truth with respect to imagination and "Soul- 
making."  These relationships concern Keats's after-life. 
The greatest difficulty in apprehending their meaning 
derives perhaps from the mind's tendency to refer to a 
11Letters. I, 185.  This is the famous "Adam's 
dream" pasflfff^t refers to the passage of Milton's P|r|- 
dise Lost which portrays the sleeping Adam dreaming Eve s 
cTeTtlHnT then waking to find her before him, VIII, 
490. 
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stereotype   of   traditional  religion's   life-after-death. 
The   hint   that   stereotypes  must  be  avoided  comes   in  the 
very  phrase   "Adam's  dream";   for   it  is   here   that   Keats 
implies   that   the   "here   after"   he  mentions,   or  the   "spiri- 
tual   repetition,"   is  not   restricted   in  time  after  man's 
death,   but  that  achieving  a   soul   implies   a   spiritual  con- 
tinuity  spanning  both   life  and  death.     Keats's  dream  is   far 
more  complex  than Milton's  concept  in  Paradise   Lost,   for 
it  represents   both man's  eternal   experience  during   life 
and   its  continuation   into  death.      Like  a  dream,   the  expe- 
riences   of   the   soul  or   imagination   find  their  prototype 
in  the  world;   they  derive   from the   life  of  man,   even   as 
their  eternal   existence  derives   from  the   identification  of 
man's   intelligence  with  God    ("they  know  and   they   see  and 
12 
they  are   pure,   in   short   they   are  God.    ..."      )      In  this 
sense,    "Adam's  dream"   becomes   a  metaphor   for  the   relation 
of   heart   knowledge  with  mind   knowledge  in  time:      it   repre- 
sents  a galvanization of  the worldly  and temporal   into 
spiritual  and eternal  experience.     With   "Adam's dream," 
Keats's  basic  concern  seems   to be  expressing the worldly 
basis  of   the   eternal   soul. 
At   first   in  this   passage,   Keats   is   not  concerned 
with  the  after-life;   he   discusses   it   later   as   "auxiliary" 
to the   imagination,   his   primary  concern.     Yet  it   is   not 
12 Letters,    II,   102. 
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difficult to see why he himself was reminded of the auxil- 
iary/ for the language in which he couches his conception 
of the imagination is suggestive of both death and the 
soul's eternal life.  "Adam's dream" is so good a model 
for these later considerations, moreover, that it is dif- 
ficult to know for certain which idea put him in mind of 
which.  One could follow his suggested ordering, although 
that seems largely a result of his being for the time in- 
terested in discussing only the imagination.  But it seems 
very likely that, through "Adam's dream," the imagination 
and the eternal life of the soul were inseparable from one 
another. 
"Adam's dream" is, at first, a model for the imagi- 
nation and seems to derive its significance substantially 
from "Soul-making." As a metaphor, the dream seems to 
relate to the imagination as the unconscious working of the 
intelligence under the heart's influence.  Where this rela- 
tionship has been referred to as the soul whose perceptions 
constitute imagination, the fact that the dream vision con- 
cerns truth is particularly apt; the imagination, like the 
dream, is the perception of truth.  The difficulty of the 
"Adam's dream" statement arises in the phrase "awoke and 
found it truth."  Discounting for the moment the implica- 
te of immortality, this phrase focuses on the relationshxp 
between the world of experience, the heart, and the soul's 
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perception of truth.  The great disparity in man's con- 
sciousness has always been that these have been out of 
phase; here Keats, in a word, shows how the reality of 
truth is transmuted into the world of experience.  Awaken- 
ing can only be a return to consciousness of the world in 
terms of heart knowledge or the mind's perception of the 
heart's experience.  What had happened before that awaken- 
ing, however, was that the mind, working instinctively, had 
found its identity in heart-knowledge, or had seen, with 
the vision of the imagination, into truth.  What, in turn, 
had anticipated this imaginative experience was the need 
to understand the troubles of the world, or to comprehend 
the harmony which Keats's mind always strove to discover. 
The dream, then, or imagination, is the perception of har- 
mony in the world of experience by the soul.  The imagina- 
tive awakening from the dream when he "found it truth" is a 
discovery that the perceived harmony does indeed justify 
experience.  This harmonizing of the true and the real is 
what Keats usually meant when he spoke of the soul, and 
perhaps the best statement of his "Soul-making" synthesis. 
Here is his best summary of how the spiritual is of sig- 
nificance only insofar as it concerns the heart.  Such per- 
ceptions, such knowledge of harmony can only result from 
the book of sensations, the "Mind's Bible," the extralogical 
and the associative. 
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Keats   supports   his   interpretation  of   "Adam's  dream" 
as  a final  step of   "Soul-making"   in the world by writing, 
"I  have  never  yet been able to  perceive  how anything can 
be   known   for   truth  by   consequitive  reasoning   .    .    .    ,"   or 
by activity of  the mind alone.     For truth to be  known by 
the  mind,   that   is,   would be   like measuring volume with 
speed,   an experiment   in disjoint dimensionality.       Here 
Keats obliquely describes  the  nature of   imagination by 
inserting   the   limitations   on  non-imaginative   experience. 
"Consequitive   reasoning," that   is,   can only  be   interpreted 
as   logic,   or  a  faculty of  the man of  power  that  he uses  to 
procure   results,   the   static conceptions  and beliefs with 
which to define himself.     It  is a  faculty ill-conceived  to 
appreciate  the harmony of  life  because  by  its  nature   it   is 
bound  into time.      "Consequitive"   seems   to  imply  a rational, 
finite,   and  temporal   sequence.     Keats   infers  the  similarity 
of   "Soul-knowledge"   with philosophical   induction where 
"consequitive   reasoning"   results   in  truth  only   by  an   act   of 
fai-h.      The   knowledge  of   the  mind,   Keats   says,   is   inade- 
quate   for  the   truth  of   the  world  which  can  be  apprehended 
by   the   imagination only.     He  re-emphasizes   this   point by 
citing  the   "ob:ections"   scientists must   "out aside"   in 
order  to  proceed with   logic  to a truth-those  objections 
;se   presence   invalidates  whatever  truth   is   supposedly 
found.      His   implication   is   that  clear   perception  comes 
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without objections, that try as a scientist might, the 
models he creates, unless products of the imagination, do 
not represent truth.  Finally, he writes, "0 for a Life of 
Sensations rather than of Thoughts 1" reaffirming that only 
in treating the heart as the source of wisdom will the soul 
:.3e to a perception of truth intelligence alone cannot 
hope for. 
In addition, "Adam's dream" seems to represent the 
eternalization of the soul made during life.  At first, 
awakening seems the merging of soul knowledge with the ex- 
perience of the world, producing a sense of nature's har- 
mony.  Here awakening can be thought of as the emergence 
from life, with soul knowledge.  The imaginative perception 
D£ truth had occurred with the inconstant character of a 
dream; now it has become a constant vision which repeats 
the harmony and sense of the soul on earth in a "finer 
tone."  This constant vision of truth is identified with 
God, and is characterized by a purely spiritual harmony of 
which the world is a small part.  This stretches the 
Miltonic conception, but that seems just in the light of 
Keats's "favorite speculation" that "we shall enjoy our- 
selves here after by having what we called happiness on 
Earth repeated in a finer tone and so repeated. ..." 
A more poetic statement of these ideas, however, 
follows another reference to the necessity of heart 
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experience and a statement of the fact that "such a fate" 
as Keats's "here after" cannot be had by those who do not 
understand the meaning of sensations.  Keats wrote "Adam's 
dream will do here and seems to be a conviction that 
Imagination and its empyreal reflection is the same as 
human Life and its spiritual repetition."  This statement 
can be maddening or simple, depending on one's ability to 
make a leap of faith, as Keats himself may have done, 
judging by the incredible metaphysics of the language. 
Simply speaking, the sentence can be understood in context: 
let "spiritual repetition" be the eternal existence of the 
intelligence as part of God, and let "empyreal reflection" 
signify the eternal vision of truth, such as Keats fre- 
quently symbolized by the ancient deities on Olympus.  He 
claims that "Adam's dream" means that, once created, the 
soul coexists through eternity with the intelligence, that 
where the intelligence is drawn back to exist forever with 
God, so the soul is projected into an eternal vision such 
as God himself enjoys. 
Keats finally returns from consideration of auxil- 
iaries to the relevance of "Adam's dream" to "Soul-making." 
"But as I was saying," he writes, "the simple imaginative 
Mind may have its rewards in the repeti[ti]on of its own 
silent Working coming continually on the spirit with a 
fine suddenness. ..."  Here it can be assumed he has 
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dropped temporal distinction to conclude that the soul is 
made of eternal abstract experience.  There is no distinc- 
tion here between the repetitions during life and after 
life.  The soul is awareness of the imagination's percep- 
tion of truth during life in the form of dreams, and after 
death continually in the here after. 
Ultimately, the significance of the "Adam's dream" 
passage is that it states in metaphor the final action of 
"Soul-making."  Here Keats uses such words as "awakened," 
"repetition," and "fine suddenness" to express this action, 
and to isolate the exact point of transition when truth is 
brought into correspondence with experience.  He was 
sharpening his philosophical tools to the cutting fineness 
of poetry in order to express this correspondence and to 
realize it in language equal to the experience itself.  It 
is no uncertain judgment then that restates "Adam's dream" 
as "a Vision in the form of Youth"; for this is the theme 
of his first supreme effort to realize it in poetry, 
"Endymion," where he joins rose-like beauty with the truth 
in which the eternal soul is conceived. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NEGATIVE CAPABILITY 
The "Negative Capability" letter begins considera- 
tion of the poetic dimension of Keats's thought.  Here 
Keats shows how the principles of the imagination and 
"Soul-making" apply to the creation of poetry by describ- 
ing the character which objectifies the harmony perceived 
by the soul in the world.  He claims, in short, that 
"Negative Capability" is the poet's identity in this har- 
mony.  It is another expression of the soul as vision, ex- 
cept discussed in terms of the soul's achievement, not its 
creation.  "Negative Capability" then seems to be two 
things—the loss of self in identification with truth in 
the world, as described in "Soul-making," and experiencing 
the identity of another object to achieve its expression in 
poetry.  The problem of "Negative Capability" is to ratio- 
nalize these two ideas:  to find the correspondence of 
"Soul-making" with the expression of harmony in poetry. 
In this letter the poet's identification with ob- 
jects is expressed in terms of "intensity," a quality of 
experience which relates to beauty and truth.  His remarks 
are provoked by his disappointment with a Benjamin West 
painting: 
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It is a wonderful picture, when West's age is con- 
sidered; But there is nothing to be intense upon; 
no woman one feels mad to kiss; no face swelling 
into reality.  the excellence of every Art is its 
intensity, capable of making all disagreeables 
evaporate, from their being in close relationship 
with Beauty & Truth—Examine King Lear & you will 
find this exemplified throughout; but in this pic- 
ture we have unpleasantness without any momentous 
depth of speculation excited, in which to bury its 
repulsiveness. ...■'■ 
Here intensity is the quality in poetry by which the imagi- 
nation experiences truth through beauty, for it expresses 
the poetic imagination's apprehension of truth.  In more 
abstract terms, intensity is the poetic, or aesthetic di- 
mension of the soul. 
In this passage, Keats is translating his philosophy 
of "Soul-making" into an aesthetic standard, and implying 
the poet's "Negative Capability."  It is important to note 
in  this regard that his thoughts proceed, as in "Soul- 
making," from the real to the spiritual; he mentions first 
faces swelling into reality and then the abstractions, 
beauty and truth.  For him, the experience of a work of art 
begins with the physical object which represents the 
artist's heart experience.  Heart experience is then trans- 
mitted through the object to the viewer and is usually 
characterized by the instinctive passionate responses of 
man's worldly nature which Keats epitomized by love.  (In 
the "Adam's dream" letter, he had written "... I have the 
"""Letters, I, 192. 
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same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they are all in 
their sublime, creative of essential Beauty. ..."  And 
now he finds nothing so appropriate as the lovely face 
ready to be kissed.)  The experience of the object depicted 
then enters into a relationship with the viewer's intelli- 
gence, for subsequently Keats writes that a property of 
intensity is that it causes disagreeables to evaporate. 
These disagreeables seem equivalent to the "numerous objec- 
tions" of the "Adam's dream" letter and the shortcomings of 
"consequitive reasoning."  For the viewer, intensity results 
in the impact of heart experience on the mind in the sense 
of "Soul-making," and thus in the object's becoming the 
means of identification by which truth is realized.  Inten- 
sity then links truth with the primary sensual experience 
of art.  Keats, therefore, remains true to his central idea, 
that the world is the prototype of spirituality.  He goes 
further, moreover, by implying that any expression of spir- 
ituality must certainly proceed from the world. 
Intensity is a projection of the imagination, where 
imagination is vision or the active quality of the soul. 
It is the reciprocal active quality of a work of art, or 
the capacity of that work to appear as truth having been 
conceived as truth by the imagination and faithfully exe- 
cuted by the artist. In the correspondence of intensity 
and imagination, then, is conceived the character of the 
' 
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artist; that is, as intensity seems to be the expression 
of a work of art, so the artist's character consists of 
the ability to act as does the object itself—to act in a 
true expression of the object.  This character must have 
an affinity with the object that perfects the identity 
achieved in "Soul-making."  But, by it, contact is made 
again with the sensual, seemingly on the other side of the 
vision.  That is, the artist could see in the experience 
of his own heart the truth of an object whose heart then 
becomes his own, with all of its senses, instincts, and 
passions.  In this identification he can speak with the 
other's voice and create spontaneously a work of intensity. 
In the sense of "Soul-making," this is a process whereby 
the artist acquires a soul through identification.  Then as 
the soul is conceived in the ability to apprehend truth, so 
is the artist of "Negative Capability" conceived in his 
ability to achieve intensity in a work of art. 
Keats frames his idea more specifically after de- 
scribing some of his recent experiences relating to "in- 
tensity," particularly the dinner party which so upset him 
(making him "start" instead of "feel").  He writes that in 
a conversation with Dilke several important things "dove- 
tailed" in his mind: 
... & at once it struck me, what quality went to 
form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature 
& which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean 
Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of 
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being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without 
any irritable reaching after fact & reason—Cole- 
ridge, for instance, would let go by a fine iso- 
lated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium 
of mystery, from being incapable of remaining con- 
tent with half knowledge.  This pursued through 
Volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, 
that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes 
every other consideration, or rather obliterates all 
considerations.* 
The meaning of this passage is perhaps most clear in 
relation to previous discussions of the mind's limitation, 
or the difference between intelligence and the soul.  What 
Keats before referred to as disagreeables and "consequitive 
reasoning," here he calls an "irritable reaching after fact 
& reason. ..."  "Negative Capability," he says, in an 
artist, is first the ability not to depend on the sight of 
intelligence, or mind knowledge.  The mind apprehends too 
simple and logical a view of things, inconsistent with the 
realities of heart experience.  At best, it conceives "con- 
sequitive" ideas far from truth.  The essence of heart ex- 
perience, on the other hand, is wonder and the mystery of 
life itself.  It is the basic nature of man which the lan- 
guage of science cannot explain.  Keats means the "Mind's 
Bible" then, when he uses words such as "uncertainties," 
"mysteries," and "doubts."  The character he discusses is 
one which confronts the experience of the heart, as the 
child confronts his hornbook, without the self-conscious 
purpose of becoming a soul.  Nor do these words connote 
'Letters, I, 193-94. 
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fear of the unknown; the way Keats uses them, they express 
rather a passivity—the character he describes declines 
the invitation to "irritable" explanation which mystery 
provides.  Where such a character has been described as 
the mind acting spontaneously, realizing truth by identifi- 
cation with the heart, the artist of "Negative Capability" 
then recreates through intensity the experience of the 
soul. 
Having suggested that Shakespeare was such a man of 
achievement in literature, referring again to Lear's in- 
tensity in particular, Keats continues by exemplifying his 
point with Coleridge.  Coleridge could accept heart know- 
ledge or the unexplainable nature of life's experience, 
its mysteries and uncertainties, because of his ability 
to capture the "fine isolated verisimilitude" from that 
mystery.  This verisimilitude for him was one object alone 
perceived by the heart through which to experience truth. 
Coleridge sought no rational explanation of the world, but 
instead created with his poems instances of his "Soul- 
making" experience.  Going beyond the letters, then, it is 
easy to grasp Keats's inference in poems such as "This 
Lime-Tree Bower My Prison," or "The Eolian Harp."  In these 
poems, Coleridge has visions of truth by means of real 
objects, and his identification with these objects in terms 
of lights and shadows, or the wind of his imagination, 
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seems nearly complete.  Keats implies that the poet of 
"Negative Capability" shows in his poem this identification 
of the mind with real objects by means of the heart.  His 
profoundest meaning may be that the vision written in the 
poem, its intensity, is impossible without the physical 
object or heart experience.  That is, the poem of intensity 
resembles the soul in that, for each, the real world is 
an induction to the spiritual.  The poet of "Negative 
Capability," therefore, illustrates the induction. 
Finally, Keats unifies the theme of the letters by 
comprehensively stating, "... with a great poet the sense 
of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather 
obliterates all consideration."  This statement merges 
"Negative Capability" with the profoundest sense of "Soul- 
making."  For Keats, the poet of "Negative Capability," the 
great poet, is primarily concerned with truth which he can 
know only by an imaginative apprehension of beauty.  "Con- 
sideration" here equates with "disagreeables," indicating 
again that Keats is chiefly concerned with the contrast 
between soul knowledge and mind knowledge.  One restatement 
of this would read:  the instinctive acceptance of heart 
knowledge in a great artist makes mind knowledge irrelevant, 
a case, in Murry's words, of the subconscious overcoming 
the conscious mind.  But the statement may be more meaning- 
ful in terms of a work of art; Keats has spoken above of 
* 
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the repulsiveness of a work being overcome by its inten- 
sity, implying that the artist of "Negative Capability" 
transmits his own unifying soul experience to the viewer 
in such a way that no matter how ugly the work's detail, 
it seems incorporated into a beautiful harmony.  This 
statement means that "consideration" is unexplored by the 
poet because of his preoccupation with truth.  In addition, 
it is this involvement with truth, or the poet's realiza- 
tion of beauty, which annihilates the possibility that "con- 
sideration" has found any identity whatever in his work. 
In short, the work is a single truth because the poet's 
experience, conceived in soul knowledge, is indivisible, 
and because its beauties are conceived in the same destruc- 
tion of "consideration" as is the poet's soul. 
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CHAPTER V 
APPLICATIONS: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
"ODE TO A NIGHTINGALE" 
Thus far this thesis represents an effort to dis- 
cover, with his letters, a principle of unity in Keats's 
thought which might serve as a basis for interpreting his 
poetry.  Where Keats's thought has been found to be uni- 
fied, it seems reasonable to expect a parallel conceptual 
consistency in his individual poems.  It seems, moreover, 
that on the basis of the philosophy of the letters, models 
might be proposed expressing the unity of poems which 
appear paradoxical to many critics, contradicting the 
claims of those, in particular, who contend that the art 
of Keats's poetry concerns rationalization, or the recon- 
ciliation of opposing ideas. 
An idea such as Allan Tate's seems particularly 
objectionable from this point of view, that the Nightingale 
expresses "... the impossibility of synthesizing, in the 
order of experience, the antinomy of the ideal and the 
real."1  It seems, that is, that there is no such antinomy 
given that, for Keats, the real is the prototype for the 
ideal.  R. H. Fogle's remarks on those of Tate seem also 
lnA Reading of Keats," On the Limits of. Poetry (New 
York:  Swallow Press, 1948), p. 177. 
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objectionable in view of a theory of Keats's philosophical 
unity.  It seems inadequate to call Tate's analytical 
"dilemma" the "source of strength" in Keats's poetry.2  But 
it is mainly Douglas Bush's comments, again, to which this 
chapter is addressed: 
. . . conflict is central in the Nightingale. . . . 
Keats feels not so much the joy of the imaginative 
experience as the painful antithesis between tran- 
sient sensation and enduring art.  He cannot wholly 
accept his own argument, because both his heart and 
his senses are divided.  The power of the imagina- 
tion, the immortality of art, offer no adequate 
recompense for either the fleeting joys or the in- 
escapable pains of mortality.  Keats's early desire 
to burst our mortal bars, to transcend the limita- 
tions of human understanding, becomes in the Night- 
ingale the desire for death, the highest sensation, 
or an anguished awareness of the gulf between life 
and death.  In the end the imagination cannot es- 
cape from oppressive actuality; far from attaining 
a vision of ultimate truth, it achieves only a 
momentary illusion. 
Bush's interpretation of "Ode to a Nightingale" seems, 
indeed, to parallel his apprehension of disunity in the 
letters, or possibly to derive from it.  In any case, his 
notion of contradiction in the letters supports such a 
reading of the ode.  It is the purpose of this chapter to 
provide a contrasting reading of "Ode to a Nightingale" 
2Richard Harter Fogle, "Keats's Ode to a Nightin- 
gale," PMLA, LXVIII (1953), 212. 
3Douglas Bush, "Keats and His Ideas," The Major Eng- 
lish Romantic Poets: A Symposium in Reappraisal, ed. 
Clarence D. Thorpe, Carlos Baker, and Bennet Weaver 
(Southern Illinois University Press, 1957), rpt. in Twen- 
tieth Century Interpretations of Keats's Odes, ed. Jack 
Stillinger (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 
p. 109. 
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based on the principle of unity that I have found to exist 
in the letters. 
A poem such as "Ode to a Nighingale" is informative- 
ly read with a teleological perspective, which only the 
letters can provide.  In fact, not to read the ode in this 
manner is to dismiss the meaning which Keats's own per- 
sonality gives to it—it is to say, in effect, that the 
life whose meaning it crystalized is irrelevant to a just 
appreciation of it.  As a work of art, the ode is certainly 
independent; this approach is not needed to justify its 
greatness; however, a clarification becomes necessary when 
critics seem to assign arbitrary values and meanings to a 
poem whose greatness cannot be clearly apprehended or stated 
in the language of analysis. 
This reading of "Ode to a Nightingale" will not 
strive to find perfect unity with every part coordinated 
to a single effect.  Such a statement would involve a kind 
of finite, quantitative approach quite incompatible with 
the obvious organic nature of the poem.  Nevertheless, 
there are concepts outside of the poem which stand in rela- 
tion to it like a magnet to the formation of metal shavings 
on a paper; and the poem's parts are ordered under stress 
of these concepts so that it is not with one another that 
they react, nor in the relations between them that notions 
of inconsistency are at all relevant.  These concepts are 
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the facets of Keats's thought which have been dealt with 
in considering some of his letters.  The illusive unity of 
the letters is the ideal ordering principle but without 
perfect statements of it, such equivalent ideas, "Soul- 
making," "Adam's dream," and "Negative Capability," may 
serve nearly as well to illustrate unification in "Ode to 
a Nightingale." 
On the basis of the above discussions of the let- 
ters, one obvious way to exemplify unification in the poem 
is by comparing it with the idea of the "Adam's dream" 
letter.  Such a discussion involves the concepts of "Nega- 
tive Capability" and "Soul-making" as well.  In this sense 
the return to self at the end of the poem is not an expres- 
sion of confusion; nor does it imply that the spiritual 
experience of the poem is short lived.  It is instead the 
integration of the soul's vision with experience of the 
real world; it is the reawakening into an appreciation of 
harmony in the world.  If this comparison is followed, a 
very persuasive argument for the unified sense of the poem 
is achieved. 
The most important element of such a comparison is 
the idea of sleep.  In the first stanza, Keats describes 
his state as being very similar to that of Milton's Adam, 
whose spiritual vision was left unaffected by the body's 
torpor.  Keats, in fact, makes it very clear in the 
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language of the letters that it is only the body, or the 
heart/ which sinks under the influence of the bird's song: 
My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains 
My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk, 
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains     . 
One minute past, and lethe-wards had sunk. . . 
The majority of the words he uses to describe this sleep 
correspond to the sensations, or experience of the heart, 
suggesting that it is only experience of the physical world 
which ceases, leaving the vision of the soul unimpaired. 
First, Keats actually uses the word "heart" and then 
"sense," which relates to the "Life of Sensations" of the 
letters.  He contrasts these with words such as "numbness" 
and "opiate" whose meanings concern mainly physical feel- 
ings, which, when associated with heart, suggest an escape 
from the "World of Pains and troubles" of "Soul-making." 
Moreover, to underscore the fact that the soul is still 
awake while the heart has been numbed, Keats immediately 
refers to the soul's experience, which suggests the "Nega- 
tive Capability" that the whole poem expresses:  "'Tis not 
through envy of thy happy lot, / But being too happy in 
thine happiness, — "  This is an expression of the identi- 
fication which lies at the heart of Keats's soul experience- 
it is the experience which caused the poet to go into his 
sleep, but it expresses as well the quality of soul 
4The Poetical Works of John Keats, ed. H. W. Garrod 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1958) , p. 257. 
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experience he will have in the form of a dream while free 
from worldly sensations. 
In the first stanza there could be an analytical 
distinction made between the world being left and the 
world being entered, for Keats is proceeding from pain to 
painlessness in an apparent expression of the opposition 
of these two worlds.  Looked at in terms of "Soul-making," 
however, Keats is really asserting the necessity of a world 
of pain to school a soul, and that such a world must serve 
as a prototype for the "finer tone" of any other.  If any- 
thing, Keats is claiming the amazing compatibility of the 
real and spiritual in asserting the numbing power of soul 
experience—the pains of the world school the human faculty 
in transcending all worldly things, including pain; if the 
world were truly inimical to the soul, it could not con- 
spire in the interest of undoing its own evil. 
In his letters, Keats compared imagination to 
"Adam's dream," writing "he awoke and found it truth." 
The sense in which the poem combines imagination with 
sleep is next in importance in this comparison.  In the 
first stanza, Keats writes that sensations are dulled by 
absorption in the nightingale's song, or its "happiness." 
In the second, he moves further still from sensation in 
his identification, with "a draught of vintage" and "a 
beaker full of the warm South, / Full of the true, the 
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blushful Hippocrene. ..."  The "Hippocrene" is the muse's 
fountain, providing the faculty of inspiration to all those 
who drink from it; it is then a kind of inspiration or 
vision which Keats longs for, or the power of the imagina- 
tion sufficient to bring him in closer identity with the 
bird than he had through its song.  But he is still only 
anticipating the truly imaginative experience of the dream, 
for even in the third stanza, he has not yet begun to expe- 
rience with the soul the harmony in which worldly suffering 
is appropriate: 
Here, where men sit and hear each other groan; 
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last grey hairs, 
Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies; 
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow 
And leaden-eyed despairs, 
Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes, 
Or new Love pine at them beyond to-morrow. 
Here Keats is still concerned with the "Soul-making" and 
the necessity for a world of pain.  In particular, he is not 
yet seeing beauty with the imagination, a beauty whose 
brevity is also a just and truthful part of the world's 
harmony.  It is not until the fourth stanza that he enters 
fully the dream, or imagination.  Here there are no more 
sensations, only the last impediment to full identification, 
the activity of the "consequitive" mind as "the dull brain 
perplexes and retards. ..."  What signifies that the 
imagination now dominates is that Keats writes: 
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Already with thee! tender is the night, 
And haply the Queen-Moon is on her throne, 
Cluster'd around by all her starry Fays; 
But here there is no light, 
Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown 
Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways. 
Of particular significance in this passage is the darkness 
that prevails within the grove of the nightingale.  What- 
ever vision is possible derives from heaven, from the 
"Queen-Moon," or some "empyreal" phenomenon associated in 
Keats's mind with the principle of the soul.  This is a 
darkness of the mind such as those Keats described in the 
"Soul-making" letter, saying, "they know and they see and 
they are pure, in short they are God. ..."  But it is, at 
the same time, the beginning of the soul's vision.  In this 
stanza then, having joined the nightingale beyond experi- 
ence of the heart and mind, Keats finally enters the dream. 
"Already with thee!" is the expression that his physical 
and rational selves are submerged at the same time in the 
bird, and an indication that his imaginative vision has 
begun. 
As an expression of Keats's imaginative vision, 
Stanzas V, VI, and VII then correspond to the dream of the 
letter.  The first of these expresses the character of the 
soul as suggested by "Soul-making" where the world is a 
prototype for the soul and the "here after."  This sense 
is conveyed by the most sensual imagery in the poem, "soft 
incense hangs upon the boughs," and "musk-rose, full of 
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dewy wine," combined with the suggestion of endlessness, 
or eternity, in such phrases as "seasonable month," "the 
coming musk-rose," and "embalmed darkness."  Keats says 
here, "I cannot see," meaning that the intellect has been 
suspended; instead he must "guess" with a new kind of 
vision at the proximity of timeless sensual beauty he de- 
scribes.  Most significantly, this new vision is not over- 
whelmed, as is earthbound sight, by the process of death in 
life.  While the mind sees misery in a world "Where but to 
think is to be full of sorrow," this new sight, by contrast, 
absorbs the "Fast fading" of violets in the greater truth 
of natural processes, or soul knowledge. 
The second of these dream stanzas, written from an 
identification with the nightingale, suggests the particular 
eternity of the soul, which Keats expressed most directly 
in the "Adam's dream" letter, and whose consideration also 
led him into the "Soul-making" discussion.  This stanza 
deals with the significance of death in the "Soul-making" 
process, and its implication for the existence of the soul 
thereafter.  Here Keats toys with the idea of immortalizing 
his great pleasure, his soul knowledge, by dying at the 
height of its intensity.  He writes, 
Darkling I listen; and, for many a time 
I have been half in love with easeful Death, 
Call'd him soft names in many a mused rhyme, 
To take into the air my quiet breath; 
Now more than ever seems it rich to die, 
To cease upon the midnight with no pain, 
While thou art pouring forth thy soul abroad 
In such an ecstasy! 
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He quickly recovers, however, with the realization that the 
bird is, after all, a part of the world, just as he is, 
and that to die would be to deprive himself of the bird's 
song and limit his potential for soul knowledge:  "Still 
wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in vain— / To thy high 
requiem become a sod."  The significant word here is 
"requiem," an equivalent to "Bible" and "holiness" in its 
power to implicate heart experience as the source of the 
soul.  The song, Keats infers, is an experience for the 
heart of man which is to be revered for its power to over- 
come his mind by intensity of feeling.  It is a heart expe- 
rience which Keats can use as a visual medium of imagina- 
tion to see into the harmony of the world.  With death, 
however, there would be no union of direct worldly experi- 
ence with the knowledge of harmony in the world, for unless 
such beauty is transitory, a true acceptance of harmony 
cannot be achieved.  But once there is such acceptance, it 
is as everlasting as the primary deity of man itself. 
Stanza VII concerns perception of harmony in the 
world through soul experience. Here Keats proceeds from 
his own mortality to the mortality of humanity, striking 
at the truth of the human condition. The nightingale's 
song is now a medium through which he transcends time to 
perceive that truth—it has become eternal and the human 
capacity which always responded to it becomes immortal in 
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spite of death: 
The voice I hear this passing night was heard 
In ancient days by emperor and clown: 
Perhaps the self-same song that found a path 
Through the sad heart of Ruth, when, sick for home, 
She stood in tears amid the alien corn. . . 
It is not just having been "heard," for hearing implies 
only the mind; hearing is by inference like sight.  The 
reference to "emperor and clown" serves more to provide a 
contrast with Ruth than to add to the depth of the concept 
of eternity.  With respect to Keats's concept of the soul, 
emperors are men of power, while clowns are children.  The 
song which passes into the "sad heart of Ruth" here bears 
the entire weight of "Soul-making."  By identifying with 
Ruth through the song, Keats is able, in his own soul ex- 
perience, to appreciate the necessity of her pain and mor- 
tality just as he did the rose's.  In so doing, he feels 
his own mortality absorbed in the harmony that embraces 
hers.  This is truly seeing into the heart of things and 
lacks only re-emergence from the dream into experience of 
the real world once again to fully accomplish the process 
of "Soul-making." 
Finally, Stanza VIII deals with the reunion of the 
dream vision with real life in the fulfillment of "Soul- 
making."  In terms of "Adam's dream," this is where he 
wakes to find truth.  This stanza gives much trouble to the 
critics who view it as a fruitless, undesired return. 
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Without such return, however, the truth of the heart, its 
harmony in the world, cannot be known, nor has soul expe- 
rience been fulfilled.  It is less significant that the 
narrator returns "Forlorn" than that he, in fact, returns. 
"Forlorn" deals more with the incidental shock of return, 
although in much criticism, it has come to represent the 
primary meaning of the stanza.  It is possible to make much 
of the fact that awakening was a painful experience; on the 
other hand, it is not to be denied that the new knowledge 
of the dream persists beyond awakening, implying perhaps 
that the acquisition of this knowledge is the important 
thing, not the contrast between being awake and being 
asleep. 
It is this knowledge that persists, this sense of 
harmony, which in terms of "Adam's dream," is now found to 
be truth.  That is, the truth of mortality discovered in 
Stanza VII is, by implication, now found when the narrator 
awakens to a world little different from the ancient corn- 
fields of Ruth; its meaning need not be restated precisely 
here, for it is amply captured as "a vision, or a waking 
dream," well-remembered for its having been confused with 
wakefulness.  Wakefulness is the crucial idea of the stanza 
then, for by declaring that he does not know if he was 
asleep or awake, Keats merges his vision with his present 
apprehension of the real, physical world.  He had found it 
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necessary to see the truth of that world as a vision, with 
the eyes of his soul.  Ultimately, by saying "Do I wake or 
sleep?" Keats is not expressing disbelief in his vision, 
nor does he doubt the nature of the truth he has appre- 
hended; rather, he is asserting that with soul knowledge 
one views the real world for its truth, or for its identity 
with a vision of truth. In fact, he is expressing his iden- 
tity in the harmony or truth of the world as the fulfill- 
ment of "Soul-making." 
A fortunate aspect of such a comparison is its in- 
ference that the "Ode to a Nightingale" expresses a resolu- 
tion of the paradox in Keats*s thought as framed by Mr. 
Bush.  An analogy with "Adam's dream" necessitates the 
"vision" by which identity is realized in harmony, and 
also the identification by which the self is lost to an 
object in the world.  Through analogy, the identity of the 
"Soul-making" letter expresses "Negative Capability" in the 
poem, objectifying a unification of the two concepts. 
Moreover, the poem also represents the evolution of 
heart experience into soul knowledge.  The nightingale's 
song is the heart experience which overwhelms both heart 
and mind to provide a vision of truth.  This vision of 
truth concerns the considerations of mortality in "Soul- 
making."  Keats sees himself as Ruth or the rose, with full 
knowledge and acceptance of the harmony that requires not 
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only the end of his individual pleasures but also his death. 
In coming back to "my sole self" in Stanza VIII, Keats is 
asserting his soul identity in the world as a result of the 
soul experience gained in his vision.  The inevitable re- 
sult of his momentary identification with truth in the world 
is that he is reunited with himself to enjoy his identity 
as a man with a soul. 
On the other hand, the vision of truth, particularly 
its expression, is an act of purest "Negative Capability." 
Nothing expresses the theme of the "Negative Capability" 
letter so well as the course of Keats's relationship with 
the nightingale through its song.  At first he is absorbed 
by the sound alone, but then, as though climbing up a 
lattice of melody, he is soon drawn into the foliage from 
which it flows, and where in "shadows numberless" he finds 
himself at last with the nightingale.  The progress toward 
the nightingale, toward, in a sense, being the bird, is 
also Keats's progress toward the vision of truth sustained 
through Stanzas V, VI, and VII, where he transcends mor- 
tality; but it is a progress by means of the nightingale, 
for it is the heart experience of the song that still sus- 
tains him—his heart is numb now but the music of the bird 
he still hears is like experience of the world repeating 
itself in "a finer tone"; the song has become a part of 
him, making his identification with the nightingale 
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slightly more plausible.  And most conspicuous is the 
degree to which, in this identification, all other "dis- 
agreeables" seem to disappear.  Considerations of the "dull 
brain" cease to affect him, he cannot think of the finality 
of death, and reality has been transformed to a distance 
of "faery lands forlorn."  The nightingale is, in fact, 
Keats's own "fine isolated verisimilitude," an experience 
unhinged from its context in the real world and made to 
bear the weight of "the Burden of the Mystery"  and so 
transcend it.  In his total absorption with the nightingale, 
Keats shares in its ability to transcend time, becoming 
himself an independent truth.  In "Ode to a Nightingale," 
there is indeed no "irritable reaching after fact & reason," 
nothing "repulsive"; all gives way to the presence of the 
nightingale, the presence of Keats, and the manner in which 
they have joined inextricably in an expression of supreme 
intensity.  Coming away from the nightingale in the end, 
Keats is doing little more than saying "I am writing this 
poem; time is nothing; my soul, this experience, my knowl- 
edge of self and truth, is the nightingale and here to stay 
forever." 
Letters, I, 277. 
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